Image is sourced from this Economist article.
Most of the information in this preamble is from the Cradle; notably here, here, here, and here.
The features of an effective American war (proxy or otherwise) is that it is a) against opponents with much less military power than you; b) with very low American losses; c) with victories you can visibly show off from time to time to justify involvement, and d) with a profit margin beyond merely giving money to military corporations. The war against Yemen was none of those; airplanes tumbled off aircraft carriers, and the navy complained of the hardest fighting conditions in decades. Conquering Yemen for its resources was inconceivable given the terrain, lack of good intelligence, and the strength of Ansarallah, and all that seemed to be visibly harmed were empty patches of desert and civilians.
Apparently, the ceasefire last month merely stipulated that they stop attacking merchant vessels in the Red Sea; it said nothing about attacking Israel. Therefore, Yemen is absolutely free to create a new blockade of Israel by just striking their airports and seaports, and all Israel can seem to do is try and bomb them in retaliation, a futile strategy which has failed to produce a military or political change in Yemen for the last decade when many other countries have tried it. And if America directly attacks them in response to attacks on Israel, the ceasefire is off, and expensive equipment will continue to be lost.
Across the strait from Yemen is an interesting array of countries. Egypt’s position in this war is well-known, and Somalia is under a kind of US occupation under the guise of fighting terrorism (Trump withdrew most troops, but they were then sent back under Biden). The other three are Sudan, Djibouti, and Eritrea. All three are increasingly being drawn into the anti-imperialist camp, as they cooperate with Iran, Russia, and/or China. Sudan is undergoing a civil war, but the rebels fighting the government are famously backed by the UAE. Djibouti has refused to allow themselves to be a launchpad for US strikes on Yemen.
Eritrea has a fascinating history of flip-flopping between West and East over the past few decades, but has, since 2020, sided with the East. It was one of the five countries to oppose the 2022 UN resolution condemning Russia’s war with Ukraine. Eritrea sends two thirds of its exports to China, and Iran has reportedly supplied them with military equipment. If a stronger link could be reforged, then Iran would have significantly less trouble sending military technology to Ansarallah, and to other friendly groups throughout the region.
Naturally, the lidless eye of the imperial core is shifting its gaze onto Eritrea. Meanwhile, Ethiopia - a country that has experienced frequent conflict with Eritrea - is part of BRICS+ and their economy is increasingly reliant on China (as is most countries’ economies nowadays). If a permanent resolution between the two could be created, it would be a victory for themselves and the Resistance, and a defeat for America, which thrives on conflict and destabilization.
Last week’s thread is here. The Imperialism Reading Group is here.
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The bulletins site is here. Currently not used.
The RSS feed is here. Also currently not used.
Israel-Palestine Conflict
Sources on the fighting in Palestine against Israel. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:
UNRWA reports on Israel’s destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.
English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.
English-language PalestineResist telegram channel.
More telegram channels here for those interested.
Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict
Sources:
Defense Politics Asia’s youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don’t want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it’s just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists’ side.
Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.
Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:
Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.
https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR’s former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR’s forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster’s telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a ‘propaganda tax’, if you don’t believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.
Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:
Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.
A preliminary update to the losses from Operation Spiderweb by Ukraine against Russian long range aviation. First post here. I say preliminary because more time is needed to analyse this, I’m posting this due to the release of the SBU video below.
Olenya Airbase: New high resolution satellite imagery confirms the complete destruction of 4 Tu-95 strategic bombers and one An-12 transport aircraft. The airframes are completely destroyed, burnt to the ground:
Belaya air base:
Satellite imagery confirms the complete destruction of 3 Tu-95s, and 4 Tu-22M3s. Also confirms the 4th Tu-95 didn’t take large damage. Update: The 4th Tu-95 did still take damage, Russia moved it and replaced it with an intact Tu-95:
Ukraine’s SBU has also released a 5 minute long compilation video of FPV drone strikes during Operation Spiderweb. What’s interesting here is that 2 A-50 AWACS aircraft are shown to be targeted, along with a lot more bombers. A lot of these aircraft, including the A-50s and some of the Tu-22Ms appear to be out of service though, missing key components like engines. We can also see what kind of Tu-95s were hit. The Tu-160s were not targeted, probably a deliberate decision as they have not played a large part in the war against Ukraine. I haven’t done a count of every aircraft. I’ll aim to do that later today.
Video on Xcancel
Video on twitter
For a preliminary count:
For a total of 24 aircraft destroyed, damaged or targeted (with 12 destroyed, 1 quite damaged, and 11 targeted, though those 11 appear to be out of service), this could go up after more long form analysis. NYT, who have spoken to people who viewed this video a few days ago, identified over 20 aircraft targeted. Having watched the video, the NYT were correct in their assesment here, though 7 of the aircraft targeted don’t appear airworthy.
As for the specification of Tu-95 targeted or destroyed (read the comment under the first post as for why this is important, MS6 cannot carry the Kh-101 cruise missile, MS16 and MSM can with MSM being the most modern with a maximum of 8 Kh-101s, Russia had 25 MS6 and 30 MS16/MSM as of 2023), I’ll try provide as accurate a breakdown below as possible. MS16 and MSM are difficult to tell apart. For those that want to do their own analysis, the MS6 has no underwing pylons, while the MS16 and MSM have underwing pylons. As for differentiating between an MS16 and MSM, the outboard underwing pylon on the MS-16 has three stations for cruise missiles, with the middle station being lowest to the ground. The MSM outboard underwing pylon only has two stations, the middle station is absent.
Confirmed Tu-95 losses by specification and serial number (where possible), this is a work in progress:
RF-94206, Bort No. “59” Red, named Blagoveshchensk. Took part in the Moscow Victory Parade in 2019, armed with a Kh-101 cruise missile here.Correction : On closer inspection, this is actually RF-94122, Bort No. “20” Red, named Dubna. This was the first Tu-95 modernised at the Samara plant in 2015, used as a battlefield prototype for the MSM modernisation program in Syria. Good article on this. Sorry about that, but I don’t think 3/4 on my first try is that bad given the low resolution of the video. Tu-95 MSM:So for the 7 Tu-95 losses:
Very costly losses, and it’s likey that the two MS16 or MSM are probably MSM. So Russia now has 24 MS6 Tu-95 airframes and 24 MS16/MSM airframes. Before this attack, they had 25 MS6 and 30 MS16/MSM. Only the MS16/MSM are Kh-101/102 capable.
Now for a focus on the nuclear triad aspect first the absolute numbers specific to the Tu-95 (Russia still has the Tu-160s which weren’t hit):
However, not all of Russia’s Tu-95s will be mission capable at the same time, some will be in for maintenance, modernisation, etc. And Ukraine hit the ones that are currently mission capable, some even armed with cruise missiles and fueled up. The most similar aircraft in the US Airforce, the B-52H, has a 53% mission capable rate. Assuming similar, this meant that Russia had 13 MS6 and 16 MSM/MS16 mission capable. They would now have 12 MS6 and 10 MSM/MS16 mission capable after this attack. That would mean, based on this assumption:
However, Russia still has the Tu-160s, around 18, for strategic long range aviation as part of the nuclear triad. These were not hit. Each Tu-160 can carry 12 Kh-102 cruise missiles, for a total of 216. These were not hit.
The A-50’s were more than likely decommissioned and being used for parts and/or decoys, considering the rust and missing engines. Tough to say if the radomes even had anything in them.
Yeah those are out of service, they don’t even have engines. I’ve been focused on the Tu-95s, so I haven’t examined the rest of the video. A lot of those Tu-22M3s also look in quite bad shape. I’ll update the post.
Thanks for the contribution!
You’ve captured their stunt doubles!
I have questions about these drone attacks.
What airfield were they against?
How far from Ukrainian lines was it?
Where were the drones launched from?
The Guardian suggests these were launched from inside Russia:
Five airfields all across Russia were targeted, put those co ordinates in Google maps and you’ll get an idea:
Attacks were most successful at Olenya and Belaya, hence the satellite imagery. The attacks against the A-50 AWACS aircraft took place at Ivanovo. Attacks at the other two airbases were not as successful, hence the lack of satellite imagery. At most aircraft were damaged there, not destroyed.
Drones were launched from inside Russia from shipping containers a few kilometres from the bases.
They targeted some airfields near Mongolia afaik.
Drones were launched from civilian trucks. So basically terrorism.
Not terrorism, perfidy. Terrorism is attacks on non combatants for political aims. Strategic bombers are not non combatants, so this is not terrorism. Perfidy is a form of deception, in this case the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status, by using shipping containers and trucks/truck drivers to launch the drones. Is it a war crime? Yes, but it’s one of those things that all sides engage in. Here’s Russia trying to export cruise missiles stored in shipping containers as part of the Club-K system in 2012, 13 years ago:
Its a war crime, but more of a war misdemeanor than a war felony.
What’s the difference between a clandestine operation and terrorism? I don’t think we should characterize an attack that very clearly hit legitimate military targets as terrorism no matter how it’s delivered. If this was used to assassinate military personal and their families in urban areas I might entertain the word, but this is an airbase housing planes directly used in or supporting the war. I can’t think of a more legitimate target if I tried.
Perhaps tangential to the context of the discussion but it’s good to note that terrorism has an unhelpfully wide definition on purpose, because the country that popularised its use had political reasons to cast the net as wide as possible.
That being said, it is usually more likely that an event is classed as terrorism if it targets civilians (including demobilised soldiers), within or near civilian infrastructure, and is perpetrated by individuals not wearing military uniforms.
Of course you can find events called terrorism that don’t meet those criteria because it’s designed to be a word with a loose definition, to the point that it’s not useful for any analysis imo.
Hit 20, Destroyed 10 seems to be what the US military analysts are landing on so you’re likely right on the mark. Keep up the good posts and the great work comrade.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-ukraine-hit-fewer-russian-195714573.html
@red_stapler@hexbear.net you might be interested in this.
There is an underlying problem with trying to do a ‘losses count’ with satellite pictures like this. The satellite imagery comes from Western sources and the released pictures can be doctored in various ways. For instance, it would be trivial for Western imperialists to release a set of images that makes the damage look more severe to match Kiev’s propaganda narrative. They can also cover up real damage to make the results of strikes look less severe too (like after Iran’s Operation True Promise II massive strikes on Tel Aviv’s airbases). That’s why I don’t put a whole lot of trust into pictures like that.
It’s pretty clear that 12 aircraft have been destroyed though, there is evidence from all sides suggesting it. Rybar also stated that 12-13 aircraft were lost in their analysis. FighterBomber says single digit losses per aircraft type, which also matches this. Ukrainian claims about 41 aircraft lost are obviously nonsense, and the aircraft targeted outside of the 12-13 lost or damaged were out of service, not airworthy. The satellite imagery matches up with on the ground photos and videos from both the Ukrainian and Russian side (some even taken by Russian soliders), and multiple different satellite image sources from different companies and using different technologies (from synthetic aperture radar to optical images in the visual spectrum) have shown the same set of damages. I included those in the first post, like this screengrab from a video taken by a Russian solider at Olenya:
Also:
The satellite imagery from Operation True Promise II didn’t cover up much if anything, there were 30-40 hits observed on Nevatim Airbase alone, including on a set of large aircraft hangars and a single F-35 hangar. Follow up imagery from different companies and sources confirmed the same damages as well as Israeli repairs at the sites.