that example isn’t you not experiencing a positive thing, your food not showing up as expected is a negative thing, even if you get a refund and so on.
IMO if the source of the negative feeling is that something good didn’t happen (regardless of expectation) it’s an example of absence of joy. Like, how is it different, from a purely empirical/experiential perspective to not live a life at all, and to live a “life” that is completely devoid of any experience (e.g. a stillborn who was never conscious). That’s still absence of joy either way, although another point where I differ from antinatalists is that I think life in itself has value, independent of experience.
if you’re never conscious you never have a subjective self.
i’m down right miserable because of good things that don’t happen, because i know they could happen. some even happened before but probably never will again. other people are experiencing them.
can your framework not tell the difference between malicious deprivation, circumstantial not-happening, and the oblivion of there not being a conscious mind to begin with?
I think you’re getting at the problem with anti-natalism, then. As I said before, I do think that absence of joy is bad, unlike them. I was talking in terms that were too general to get into malicious deprivation, circumstance, and complete absence, which you need to discuss if you want a framework that prescribes culpability. As I said, I’m not an ethical philosopher, just trying to describe the philosophy and the contradictions I see in it.
IMO if the source of the negative feeling is that something good didn’t happen (regardless of expectation) it’s an example of absence of joy. Like, how is it different, from a purely empirical/experiential perspective to not live a life at all, and to live a “life” that is completely devoid of any experience (e.g. a stillborn who was never conscious). That’s still absence of joy either way, although another point where I differ from antinatalists is that I think life in itself has value, independent of experience.
if you’re never conscious you never have a subjective self.
i’m down right miserable because of good things that don’t happen, because i know they could happen. some even happened before but probably never will again. other people are experiencing them.
can your framework not tell the difference between malicious deprivation, circumstantial not-happening, and the oblivion of there not being a conscious mind to begin with?
I think you’re getting at the problem with anti-natalism, then. As I said before, I do think that absence of joy is bad, unlike them. I was talking in terms that were too general to get into malicious deprivation, circumstance, and complete absence, which you need to discuss if you want a framework that prescribes culpability. As I said, I’m not an ethical philosopher, just trying to describe the philosophy and the contradictions I see in it.